Countermeasures against GPS Spoofing Attacks on Phasor

Jinsub Kim
Assistant Professor, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Oregon State University
https://rensselaer.webex.com/rensselaer/j.php?MTID=m4f20e77510938be4614a9e0baeb25e11
Fri, May 21, 2021 at 11:00 AM

Phasor measurement units (PMUs) in power systems provide high-rate, direct measurements of bus voltage phasors by leveraging the GPS-synchronized clocks. The advent of PMU has led to advances in power system monitoring, analysis, and control. However, their reliance on GPS signals for clock synchronization renders PMUs subject to GPS spoofing attacks, which can introduce biases to phase angle measurements of the spoofed PMUs. In this talk, we present a sparse error correction framework to correct potentially spoofed PMU measurements. We work with a practical assumption that only a small number of PMUs will be under GPS spoofing attacks at the same time. By analyzing the measurement equations for PMUs, we derive simple conditions for attack identifiability in terms of the power system topology and the locations of spoofed PMUs. These conditions explain how we can allocate PMUs in a grid to achieve maximal resilience against GPS spoofing attacks. Furthermore, a scalable error correction algorithm is developed and validated using MATLAB simulations with the RTS-96 and IEEE 300-bus test cases.

Jinsub Kim is an assistant professor in the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon. He received a PhD degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering from Cornell University. His research interest spans signal processing, power systems, and machine learning. Since 2019, he has been the chair of IEEE Signal Processing Society chapter of IEEE Oregon section. A paper from his research group received a student paper award at IEEE GlobalSIP 2018.